# Russia’s Hybrid War Does Not Always Begin With a Bomb

Russia is supposedly encircled, NATO supposedly provoked the war, nobody will ever really know the truth, Ukraine and Russia are allegedly equally to blame, and any counter-interference measure can be denounced as “Russophobia”.

By Paul-Michel Manandise · 2 September 2026 · CEAS Editorial Cell

Translated from the French. Original published on CEAS: https://www.ceas.info/publication/guerre-hybride-russe-france-reseaux-influence-subversion

War does not always begin with bombs

# Key findings

• Russia regards the information space as a strategic domain and uses information manipulation in conjunction with other instruments of power and hybrid warfare.
• France and French-speaking audiences are directly among the documented targets of several Russian information operations, notably Portal Kombat, Matryoshka and Storm-1516.
• VIGINUM considers Storm-1516 to be foreign digital interference posing a significant threat to French and European digital public debate.
• Portal Kombat is a structured network of hundreds of digital portals that disseminate and amplify pro-Russian content for international and European audiences.
• The Council of the European Union has explicitly documented the role of Rossotrudnichestvo in amplifying Russian propaganda and the use of its network of “Russian Houses”.
• The European Parliament has condemned Moscow’s exploitation of the Orthodox religion for geopolitical ends and the instrumentalisation of the Moscow Patriarchate as a tool of influence over certain Orthodox populations.
• The European Parliament has also documented the historical cooperation between the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church in projecting Russian influence abroad.
• In 2026 the European Union sanctioned a senior official of the Russian Orthodox Church, citing his role in spreading propaganda and disinformation justifying Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
• The accompanying CEAS corpus lists nearly 300 places and structures in France, including cultural bodies, schools, associations, Franco-Russian networks, community organisations and religious structures, with addresses, telephone numbers and other available information.
• This corpus must be used as a basis for mapping and qualification, not as a list of organisations automatically accused of espionage or illegal activity.
• A significant indicator is not the existence of a Russian venue in itself, but the possible combination of several factors: funding, governance, institutional affiliation, Russian contacts, partnerships, events organised, narratives spread and connections with other structures.
• Echo chambers are an essential function of contemporary disinformation operations: repetition, amplification and cross-circulation can turn a narrative originating in an influence apparatus into content that appears spontaneous or organic.
• The useful civic response rests on information vigilance, verification, lawful OSINT, documentation of public connections and reporting to the competent authorities — not on harassment or the private surveillance of individuals.

RUSSIA’S HYBRID WAR DOES NOT ALWAYS BEGIN WITH A BOMB.

Sometimes it begins in a conference room, a cultural association, a “Russian House”, a school, an organisation of “compatriots”, a religious body linked to Moscow, a media outlet, a “Franco-Russian friendship” circle or an event that seems perfectly harmless. That is precisely how an effective influence strategy works: it first presents itself in a civilian, cultural, educational or associative guise. The Kremlin knows how to use culture, history, religion, diasporas, the media and certain associative networks as instruments of presence, legitimisation and influence.

With this publication I am attaching a document (available on the original page) listing nearly 300 places and structures in France, with their addresses, telephone numbers and various available information: houses of Russian “culture”, schools, associations, Franco-Russian “friendship” circles, community, religious or cultural structures. This list obviously does not mean that each of these structures is an intelligence cover or takes part in illegal activity. It must be regarded as a map of ecosystems to be examined, carefully distinguishing perfectly legitimate activities from structures that are genuinely linked to, funded, directed or instrumentalised by Russian state bodies.

For some of these environments can become relays of propaganda, disinformation and ideological subversion, echo chambers where the same narratives circulate until they take on the appearance of spontaneous opinion. Russia is supposedly encircled, NATO supposedly provoked the war, nobody really knows the truth, Ukraine and Russia are allegedly equally to blame, sanctions are said to be nothing but “Russophobia”, and any attempt at counter-interference an attack on Russian culture. That is how an influence operation works: it does not necessarily seek to make you a supporter of Moscow. Sometimes it is enough to make you sceptical, confused, tired, passive or unable to distinguish clearly between aggressor and victim.

Russia’s hybrid war functions as a complete ecosystem: propaganda, disinformation, political influence, historical manipulation, cyber operations, sabotage, intimidation, recruitment of intermediaries, intelligence gathering, economic pressure, social networks, associative structures and ideological subversion can all reinforce one another. Its effectiveness rests precisely on our tendency to look at each of these elements separately, when they must be analysed as different components of one and the same architecture.

That is why counter-interference work must not remain the preserve of specialised services alone. At their own level, every citizen can contribute to the resilience of their country, but they must do so lawfully and intelligently: check information before sharing it, identify manipulative narratives, document publicly accessible facts, report genuinely suspicious behaviour to the competent authorities, support the journalists and researchers who work on foreign interference, and refuse to become an echo chamber for propaganda themselves.

This is not about intimidating people, harassing associations, following individuals or conducting surveillance operations oneself. That would be dangerous, counter-productive and sometimes illegal. Observing publicly, analysing, documenting, asking questions in public and reporting verifiable facts to the authorities: yes. Taking the place of the intelligence services or turning citizens into vigilantes: no. A democracy defends itself precisely by remaining more rigorous than those who seek to destabilise it.

For there is a fundamental reality to understand: you may feel that France is not at war with Russia. You may regard this confrontation as distant, confined to Ukraine or reserved for governments and the military. But for years the Russian state has been conducting influence, disinformation, cyberattack, interference and destabilisation operations against European societies. Not considering yourself to be in a hybrid war does not mean that the adversary regards you as neutral.

What is ultimately targeted is not only a government or a military alliance. It is collective trust, national cohesion, the ability to tell truth from falsehood, institutions, democratic values, history, language, culture and freedom of thought. An authoritarian power does not need to conquer every territory physically in order to win a strategic victory: sometimes it is enough to convince a society that it no longer deserves to be defended, that its institutions are all corrupt, that truth no longer exists and that all resistance is futile.

That is why the best response is collective resilience. Ask questions. Check funding. Examine institutional links. Identify leaders and intermediaries. Study partnerships. Understand which narratives are being spread. Map connections with official Russian bodies. Document publicly what can be documented. Pass on to the competent services what requires investigation. And above all, never let disinformation turn our own anger into behaviour that would ultimately serve the adversary’s propaganda.

This is not about fighting Russian culture. It is about preventing the Russian state from turning culture into an instrument of influence. It is not about fighting the Orthodox faith. It is about preventing the Kremlin from turning religion into a geopolitical lever. It is not about suspecting an entire population. It is about mapping, documenting, understanding and countering the structures that actually serve the interests of a hostile power.

A hybrid war is not won solely by soldiers, police officers or intelligence services.

It is won when the state, the armed forces, the services, civil society, researchers, journalists and citizens understand that they are defending the same information and democratic space.

The state, the army and the people — together against interference, manipulation and subversion.

CEAS — Making the invisible war visible.

#CEAS

# Limitations & uncertainties

The main analytical risk is conflating cultural proximity to Russia with participation in a Russian state influence apparatus. It is imperative to distinguish genuinely independent associations, ordinary religious or cultural activities, and organisations directly or indirectly connected to the Russian state apparatus.

An address, a telephone number, a cultural event, the use of the Russian language or membership of the Orthodox Church are not sufficient indicators of hostile activity.

The presence of an organisation in the corpus of nearly 300 places therefore does not, without additional evidence, justify describing it as a propaganda relay, an influence organisation, an intelligence cover or a clandestine structure.

Some institutional relationships can also change rapidly: a change of leadership, funding or partners, the closure of a structure, a change of address or a break with a Russian organisation.

Finally, measuring the real impact of an information operation remains difficult. VIGINUM itself stresses that the visibility of a narrative does not automatically determine its real influence on opinions.

# Methodological note

This publication is based on an OSINT / NARINT / network analysis approach, combining public data, institutional information, entity mapping and documentation of narratives.

Each structure should ideally be assessed according to several independent layers: legal identity; location; leaders; beneficial owners where accessible; funding; partners; affiliation with Russian bodies; links with Rossotrudnichestvo or other Russian public bodies; diplomatic relations; digital presence; recurring speakers; events; publications; narratives relayed; interpersonal connections; historical evolution of the structure.

The analytical qualification must then be graduated: structure identified → connection documented → potential relay → established relay → documented coordination → attributed hostile activity, without artificially skipping the intermediate levels.

The aim of the corpus is therefore not to establish collective guilt, but to turn a scattered set of structures into an analysable relational graph, making it possible to look for concentrations, common intermediaries and architectures of influence.

# Sources & references

1. EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats, 03.2026: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS 4th Threat Report_web version_1.pdf
2. VIGINUM — Storm-1516, 06.05.2025: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516
3. VIGINUM — Guerre en Ukraine : trois années d’opérations informationnelles russes, 24.02.2025: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/viginum/publications/guerre-en-ukraine-trois-annees-doperations-informationnelles-russes
4. VIGINUM — Matriochka, 06.2024: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/matriochka-une-campagne-prorusse-ciblant-les-medias-et-la-communaute-des-fact-checkers
5. Council of the EU / EUR-Lex — Rossotrudnichestvo: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6808-2023-INIT/en/pdf — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/571/oj/eng
6. European Parliament (EPRS) — Russia’s war on Ukraine: The Kremlin’s use of religion as a foreign policy instrument: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2022)729430
7. European Parliament — resolution on Russian disinformation and historical falsification: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-10-2025-0074_EN.html
8. EU — sanctions regime against Russian destabilising activities, 2026: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/2026-06-15/eng
9. CEAS France corpus — ~300 places and structures (original page).

Paul-Michel Manandise – CEAS, Centre Européen d’Analyse Stratégique – ceas.info

Original article: https://www.ceas.info/publication/guerre-hybride-russe-france-reseaux-influence-subversion